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CHANGING THE MEANING OF MOTHERHOOD
MARTHA M. ERTMAN*

like amnesiacs
in a ward on fire, we must
find words
or burn.
-

Olga Broumas'

Linda McClain's alliteratively titled contribution to this
Symposium, Care As a Public Value: Linking Responsibility,
Resources, and Republicanism, makes a number of important
contributions to the discourse of dependency in legal, political, and
feminist theory.2 She argues that we should conceive of parenting as a
public value, contesting the privatization of care that is central to the
1996 federal welfare reform, and buttressing her claims with popular
rhetoric such as support for "responsible fatherhood." Braiding a
wide range of interdisciplinary material and considerable data to
support her argument, she explores ways that poor women suffer
abysmally from legal and social understandings of care as a private
responsibility, and further proposes that these injustices could be
remedied by expanding the category "working families" to include
women caring for their children. She rightly points out that "[w]hat is
needed is a more sustained focus upon the role of care in fostering
human and social capital and a rejection of the simple equation of

* Associate Professor, University of Denver College of Law. Thanks to Katharine
Silbaugh for putting together a varied and rich symposium, and to Katherine Franke, Linda
McClain, and Annette Stroud for thoughtful comments on an earlier draft of this Commentary.
1. Olga Broumas, Artemis, in BEGINNING WITH 0 23, 24 (1977).
2. Linda C. McClain, Care As a Public Value: Linking Responsibility, Resources, and
Republicanism, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1673 (2001) [hereinafter McClain, Care As a Public
Value]. Professor McClain's article in this Symposium is but one piece of her "larger project of
attempting to develop a synthetic, or feminist and liberal, normative account of rights,
responsibilities, and governmental promotion of good, self-governing lives." Linda C. McClain,
Toward a Formative Project of Securing Freedom and Equality, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1221, 1221

(2000).
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personal responsibility and good citizenship with market partici'3
pation."
As McClain recognizes, there are many kinds of work. Such an
insight is crucial to any proposal to alter the current tendency not to
remunerate the homemaking labor that primary caretakers do for
their families. Her approach poses some difficulties, ones suggesting
that future analysis should build on her fine work and continue
exploring ways to achieve the important goal of increasing the
economic and social support that primary caregivers receive. One
way to continue the exploration of the problem of undervaluation of
care, an alternative to McClain's focus on public law, looks to the
ways that private law might address the problem of undervaluing
care. Either approach is possible because families, like wage labor,
have both public and private dimensions.
There are, of course, benefits and dangers in focusing on either
pubic or private remedies to the problem of devalued homemaking.,
Public law generally rests on majoritarian, moral considerations and
can justify distribution of public funds. However, it also tends to
recognize only those activities that are consistent with majoritarian
morality and forces people into particular forms of intimate affiliation
in order to enjoy access to the public fisc. 5 Private law, in contrast,
rests on considerations of intentionality, individuality, and freedom
from majoritarian morality. As such it can best protect those who
have the resources (both material and social) to exercise their
individuality and express their intentionality. However, it is less
helpful to those who cannot exercise contractual intentionality or lack
the resources to do so. In spite of these limitations of using private
law, I have attempted to craft a proposal that uses private law to
6
value homemaking labor.
I have suggested that we import the debtor/creditor rules of
Uniform Commercial Code Article 9 to recognize the contributions
3. McClain, Care As a Public Value, supra note 2, at 1679.
4. The very distinction between public and private has generated extensive critique. See,
e.g., Symposium: The Public/PrivateDistinction, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 1289 (1982).
5. Katherine M. Franke, Becoming a Citizen: Reconstruction Era Regulation of African
American Marriages,11 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 251 (1999). While additional elements of public
law, Such as constitutional Law, purport to protect
orityinterests,
---even these protectionsare
often thin and contingent, supporting majoritarian interests indirectly in a seeming support of
minority claims. For a discussion of this pattern under the First Amendment religion provisions,
see Stephen M. Feldman, The Development of Religious Freedom As a Constitutional Norm
(2000) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
6. See Martha M. Ertman, Commercializing Marriage:A Proposalfor Valuing Women's
Work Through PremaritalSecurity Agreements, 77 TEX. L. REV. 17 (1998).
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that primary homemakers make to family wealth, in particular to the
earning capacity of primary wage-earners.7 Couples would sign a
document that I call a Premarital Security Agreement ("PSA") when
applying for a marriage license, and the PSA would grant the lowerearning spouse a security interest in marital property (construed to
8
include part of the primary wage-earner's post-divorce income).
When a couple divorces, the security interest would entitle the
primary homemaking spouse to exercise self-help to repossess marital
property to recoup her investment in the marital enterprise, much as
financing companies repossess cars when debtors default on loans. 9
My proposal would largely benefit primary homemakers with
sufficient marital property to repossess, but could also benefit poorer
homemakers by offsetting their entitlements to remuneration for
homemaking against any marital debts.10 Other post-divorce income
sharing proposals similarly benefit middle- and upper-middle-class
people more than the poor caregivers who are in particularly dire
need of material support." Thus purely private solutions cannot
resolve the problem of remunerating carework across the board. I
identify in this Commentary some parallel weaknesses of a public law
approach and suggest that public-private hybrids may offer
opportunities to maximize the strengths and minimize the weaknesses
of each approach.
My main concern about McClain's public law approach is that it
may have unintended consequences of valorizing contemporary
gender roles that push women into maternity and away from
economic, social, and political independence.
To be fair, she
disassociates herself from that goal, identifying her aim as taking
"both care and women's equality seriously, and so move from the
gendered division of labor for care to a redistribution of responsibility
between women and men, and among families, employers, and
government."' 2 However, despite these good intentions, her proposal
might reify the very maternal category that she sets out to
7. Id. at 19-20.
8. Id. at 39-41.
9. Id. at 94-95.
10. Id. at 104-05.
11. See, e.g., Katherine Wells Meighan, For Better or for Worse: A Corporate Finance
Approach to Valuing Educational Degrees at Divorce, 5 GEO. MASON L. REV. 193 (1997);
Cynthia Starnes, Divorce and the Displaced Homemaker: A Discourse on Playing with Dolls,
Partnership Buyouts and Disassociation Under No-Fault, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 67 (1993); Joan
Williams, Is Coverture Dead? Beyond a New Theory of Alimony, 82 GEO. L.J. 2227 (1994).
12. McClain, Care As a Public Value, supra note 2, at 1680.
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deconstruct. Many of the same types of criticisms can be, and have
been, made about my work as well.,3 Thus, this Commentary is less a
critique of McClain's approach than an exploration of some of the
obstacles faced by anyone attempting to fashion a remedy to the
manifestly unreasonable nonremuneration of the work that many
women do caring for their families.
Perhaps one cause of this difficulty is that both work and family
carry mixed political valences. Family is at once exploitative and a
site of human flourishing; paid labor similarly involves both
subjection to regulatory controls and freedom through access to
capital and identity. Thus any model justifying public support (or
lack thereof) for care will be both empowering and retrograde. The
trick, if this is the case, is to adopt a proposal that maximizes benefits
while minimizing burdens. To contribute to this analysis of whether
the benefits outweigh the burdens of a public law approach, I identify
here some of the drawbacks of a public approach and sketch out how
a private law approach, or a mixture of public and private law, might
provide an alternative route to remunerating care work.
One benefit of private law approaches is that they can
accommodate more family forms. In positing that families, "in a good
society, serve as places or sources of growth or development of
capacities and virtues important to being good citizens and good
people,"' 14 McClain implicitly raises questions of what counts as
appropriate capacities and virtues important to being good citizens
and good people. Left open is the question of whether some families
are better at producing good citizens than others. What concerns me
is the possibility that only one type of family, or a limited range, will
count.
For example, would families who home school their children
create good citizens, given that home schooling is often associated
with withdrawal rather than participation in public communities? 5
Might one argue that families with two parents of the same sex do not
create good citizens because they might generate confused gender
roles? McClain does not address families other than those with

13. See Jane S.Schacter, Taking the InterSEXional Imperative Seriously: Sexual Orientation
and Marriage Reform, 75 DENV. U. L. REV. 1255, 1258-59 (1998); Vicki Schultz, Life's Work,
100 COLUM. L. REV. 1881, 1900, 1905 (2000).
14. McClain, Care As a Public Value, supra note 2, at 1690.
15. See Margaret Talbot, A Mighty Fortress, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2000, § 6 (Magazine), at
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heterosexual parents and their minor children.

6

In doing so she

overlooks how other family forms might or might not be vehicles to
citizenship. These include families characterized by substantial care
responsibilities (such as adults caring for elderly, ill, or otherwise
dependent adult family members) as well as families where two
partners are economically and physically independent. Because her

justification of reconceiving childcare as a public value turns on
harnessing popular rhetoric viewing parenting as "the most important
job anyone has in society," 7 her analysis leaves out many intimate
affiliations and elevates one endeavor above all others. It moreover

runs the risk of denigrating other, nonparenting work.1 8 As I have
written elsewhere, private law offers a range of models (such as
corporations, partnerships, and limited liability companies) that could
justify recognizing a range of family forms (such as marriage,
cohabitation, and polyamory).19 As such, private models may be

necessary components of a model that remunerates care in the
greatest number of contexts. While one could argue that many of

these alternative affiliations do not need government support in the
same way that families with children do, many of the affiliations

include dependencies (such as caring for an elderly or ill partner or
parent) that are not covered when we focus on parenting as a
justification for publicly supporting care.
An additional reason that McClain's argument does not take us
as far as we need to go in the care debate is that her reliance on
liberal theory may be internally inconsistent. Liberalism rests on
ideals of individualism and autonomy, but McClain rests her claim
that mothers are entitled to rights to public support on derivative
rather than individual grounds. Specifically, she contends that
mothers are citizens, not as individuals, but rather by virtue of the
16. McClain does support extension of family forms, but does not specify how that
extension might conflict with a model valorizing childcare above all other work. McClain, Care
As a Public Value, supra note 2, at 1690. For further analysis of how her approach to
deliberative democracy could accommodate same-sex marriage, see Linda C. McClain,
Deliberative Democracy, Overlapping Consensus, and Same-Sex Marriage, 66 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1241 (1998).
17. McClain, Care As a Public Value, supra note 2, at 1677.
18. I would say that artists, electricians, teachers, garbage collectors, doctors, lab
technicians, activists, and farmers, to name just a few, have jobs that are as important as
parenting.
19. See Martha M. Ertman, Marriage As a Trade: Bridging the Private/PrivateDistinction,
36 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 79 (2001). By polyamory I mean any affiliation including more
than two adults, whether or not sexual. The category includes polygamy, polyandry, group
marriage, a lesbian couple with a known sperm donor, and a gay male couple and the biological
mother of their child.
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way that they engage in the "task of nurturing children and ensuring
their moral development and education in order to prepare them to
take their place in the wider culture, as responsible, self-governing

persons.

' 20

Yet a robust liberal notion of citizenship likely requires

individual, rather than derivative, grounding. Mothers, in McClain's

analysis, are not citizens in their own right but rather citizens by
virtue of the fact that they create citizens. This model seems to
suggest that women can access citizenship through two routes: care
work and wage labor. This possibility raises a number of issues.
Does it mean that we have (or should have) two classes of female
citizenship, a direct one for wage laborers and a derivative one for
mothers? Is fatherhood also a route to citizenship, or do men access
citizenship through other routes, such as military service and wage

labor? 21 Are women who do not engage in "the most important job
anyone has in society" 22 somehow inferior citizens to mothers? 23 In
the alternative, female wage-labor citizens may be viewed as superior
to mothers because their claims are direct rather than derivative. The

answers to these questions would illuminate the precise way in which
McClain seeks to reconstruct both motherhood and citizenship.
McClain seeks nothing less than to redefine motherhood from
selfless caregiver to citizen. In the 1970s, lesbian feminists (scholars,
poets, artists, activists, musicians) performed the kind of cultural

alchemy

that McClain

and other feminist theorists seek to

accomplish. 24 Olga Broumas's poem Artemis conveys the urgency of
this task:
20. McClain, Care As a Public Value, supra note 2, at 1683.
21. This question raises the issue of whether it is the status of parenthood that creates
citizenship, or the conduct of engaging in caretaking labor of intimates. If it is the conduct of
caretaking that constitutes citizenship, then of course primary caretaking fathers access
citizenship through childcare just as primary caretaking mothers can. However, this status/
conduct distinction raises additional issues, such as whether, under a regime that focuses only on
conduct, a primary caretaker who is not a family member, such as a nanny, can access
citizenship through that conduct. If so, does it happen immediately, or only after a period of
service?
22. McClain, Care As a Public Value, supra note 2, at 1677.
23. Of course, any particular person can access citizenship in a number of ways. A mother
could be (and often is) also a wage laborer, and many men both serve in the military and later
engage in wage labor. The question, then, might be whether someone who is a citizen on
multiple fronts (primary caretaker, veteran, and wage earner) is more of a citizen or entitled to
more benefits than someone who is only a wage laborer, or who is only a primary caretaker.
24. See, e.g., MARY DALY, GYN/ECOLOGY: THE METAETHICS OF RADICAL FEMINISM
(1978); JILL JOHNSTON, LESBIAN NATION: THE FEMINIST SOLUTION (1973); KATE MILLETT,
SEXUAL POLITICS (1970). In the 1980s, lesbian feminists of color similarly engaged in cultural
alchemy. See, e.g., AUDRE LORD, SISTER OUTSIDER: ESSAYS AND SPEECHES (1984); THIS
BRIDGE CALLED MY BACK: WRITINGS BY RADICAL WOMEN OF COLOR (Cherrie Moraga &
Gloria Anzaldtia eds., 1981).
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like amnesiacs
in a ward on fire, we must

find words
25
or burn.
In this same spirit, McClain's project further develops Martha
Fineman's groundbreaking work suggesting that legal regulation
should focus on dependency rather than sexual affiliations.26 Thirty
years ago, lesbian feminists similarly shifted the cultural understanding of lesbian from desiccated spinster to ambitious amazon.
One crucial voice in this process was folk singer Alix Dobkin, who
held women-only concerts and cleverly converted folk and other
standards to the use of this revolution. One classic Dobkin piece,
Amazon ABC, reworks the heterosexual classic A You're Adorable,
B You're So Beautiful:
"A" you're an Amazon
"B" -coming Brave and strong
Clearly and Consciously you "C"

"D" you're so Dykey
"E" how you Excite me
27
How Fortunate a Female Faculty

25. Broumas, supra note 1.
26. See MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY
AND OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES (1995).
27. The rest of the lyrics are:
"G" I Guess it's Good for me
"H" how Heavenly
"I" never knew how butchy I could be
"J" for sweet Justice
"K" for sweet Kisses
"L" -e-s-b-i-a-n for Letting go of
I'M" -e"N"
"0" -ppression is no longer Over me, Oh
"P" is Political: Power to the Personal
"Q" for the Queer you feared you
"R" Remember you gotta Respect your
"S" -sential Sensibility (sexuality)
Time and Truth Touch (Between us is a Tie)
"U" -terine empathy
"V" is for Vagina, the Virgin you can
"W" experience (a universe) until you can do (get through to)
"X" -actly what you want (where you want) to X-ist
"Y" let them drive you craaa- (not Y's up? but it's not e e-)
Now I know my "ABC's"

1740
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Just as Alix Dobkin and other radical lesbians contributed to a
cultural climate that allowed us to tamper with the archetype of a
woman without a man, remapping it from pitiful, ugly, and asexual to
strong, independent, and feisty, McClain seeks to tamper with that
most sacred of cows, the mother. Her mothers are sometimes with
men, sometimes without them. This breadth alone marks her project
as an ambitious one. My comments sound a cautious note of what
unintended consequences might flow from it, and suggest some
alternative routes to this important goal.
McClain mines the public benefits of the three Rs (responsibility,
resources, and republicanism), overlooking the retrograde dangers of
elevating conventional families to "seedbeds of civic virtue"2 8 and
making women's citizenship claims derivative by linking them to the
creation of citizens. Fully recognizing that private rhetoric comes
with its own retrograde dangers, I nevertheless prefer those dangers
to the majoritarian morality of the public sphere. Where McClain
focuses on the three Rs, I go back to (almost) the beginning of the
alphabet, focusing on three Cs: consideration, commodification, and
citizenship.
I.

CONSIDERATION

McClain focuses on care, as do other scholars addressing the
tensions between childcare responsibilities and full economic and
social citizenship, making a convincing case that care is both crucial
and undervalued on numerous levels. Another way to think about
care is through the lens of consideration. Consideration has multiple
meanings, including the act of thinking about another person and the
contract doctrine used to describe value given that makes an
agreement legally enforceable.
Socially, consideration is defined as "continuous and careful
thought." 9 Kindness (which is etymologically related to kinship) 30 is
implicit in this understanding of consideration. McClain rightly
Next time won't you sing with me!
Alix Dobkin, Amazon ABC, on LOVE & POLITICS: A 30 YEAR SAGA (Ladyslipper Music
1992).

28. McClain, Care As a Public Value, supra note 2, at 1690. Civic virtue, could, of course,
include equality on the basis of race, sex, gender, and sexual orientation as key components.
This kind of civic virtue, however, might not command the majoritarian support that
expenditure of public funds often requires.
29. MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 246 (10th ed. 1993).
30. Id. at 642.
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points out that we should continuously and carefully think about the
extraordinary contributions and sacrifices that go into caring for
children. She also points out that we need to consider the caretaking
work that poor people do for their families." I would add that we
should also consider the care for other dependents, such as elderly, ill,
or disabled parents, partners, or other intimates, and moreover
remember that economically independent partners may also be
citizens by virtue of their partnership.
A second meaning of consideration is contractual: consideration
is "bargained for," meaning that a performance or return promise is
"sought by the promisor in exchange for his promise and is given by
the promisee in exchange for that promise. '32 McClain suggests that
we think of mothers as citizens and remunerate them for their public
contributions, remaining agnostic about whether that payment should
take the form of public subsidies of mothering (which she calls a
"modern mothers' pension") or daycare as a mandatory employee
benefit.3 3 Either one could further her goal of laying the theoretical
foundations for reconceptualizing motherhood, and "break[ing] down
the breadwinner/caregiver dichotomy." 4 Once we accept this new
liberal conception of motherhood, then monetary gains should follow.
Consideration is one way to justify the payments. If the bargain
society strikes with mothers is that they create citizens, then both
material support for that activity and the act of childcare could
constitute consideration. Implicitly, mothers bargain for support in
exchange for caregiving, bargaining with partners and/or with the
state. In bargaining with partners, the partners exchange support for
the benefits of fatherhood (or, where parties are same-sex couples,
parenthood). In bargaining with the state, the state exchanges
support for citizen creation. This last analysis justifies getting
material resources to people who need them most: poor women and
their children. However, paradoxically, policymakers may deem the
caregiving work of poor women and many women of color
35
insufficient consideration to support their citizenship claims.

31. For a review of how the 1996 federal welfare reform devalues poor people's family
work, see JULIE A. NICE & LOUISE G. TRUBECK, CASES AND MATERIALS ON POVERTY LAW:

THEORY AND PRACTICE 235-84 (Supp. 1999); Dorothy E. Roberts, The Value of Black Mothers'
Work, 26 CONN. L. REV. 871 (1994).
32.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 71 (1981).

33. McClain, Care As a Public Value, supra note 2, at 42.
34. Id. at 1714.
35. See Roberts, supra note 31, at 873-74.
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Perhaps McClain's goal of deconstructing the homemaker/
breadwinner dichotomy could be further developed through the
private law doctrine of contract. If the above analysis of bargained
for exchange seems strained or troublesome, suppose that, rather
than see the contract as a discrete one between the mother and the
state, we view the contract as the social contract that is said to justify
civil society in the first instance. 36 Marsha Garrison has sketched the
outlines of a contractarian theory of family that could further
McClain's goal of getting cash to poor women and caregivers
37
generally.
Garrison, like McClain, grounds her proposal in liberal theory,
namely John Rawls's theory of justice. 38 Garrison's social contract
analysis both echoes and diverges from McClain's. Where they
diverge, Garrison's better serves considerations of justice because her
analysis would justify more money going to a wider range of
caregivers and moreover is direct rather than derivative. Specifically,
Garrison and McClain both justify public funding for childcare, but
Garrison's social contract approach also justifies payments for elderly
and other nonchild dependent care.
Garrison suggests that we go behind the veil and ask what we
would choose the rule to be if we do not know whether we will be
male of female, parent or not, rich or poor. 39 Under this reasoning
people would reasonably choose to remunerate parenting.40 I think
that they would also remunerate through the public fisc other forms
of care, such as care of elderly, disabled, or ill intimates. Similarly,
because people would not know whether they would be in a socially
sanctioned affiliation (marriage) or another one (say, polyamory) or
single, they would choose to have the payments go to caregivers
regardless of whether they are married. While McClain spends
considerable time discussing poor single women and takes pains to
say that marriage alone is insufficient to remedy the crushing

36. See CAROLE PATEMAN, THE SEXUAL CONTRACT 10-11 (1988).

37. See Marsha Garrison, Toward a ContractarianAccount of Family Governance, 1998
UTAH L. REV. 241.

38. See Garrison, supra note 37, at 257; McClain, Care As a Public Value, supra note 2, at

1683. McClain focuses on Rawls's analysis of the family as "part of the basic structure [of
political society], since one of its main roles is to be the basis of orderly production and
reproduction of society .... The family must ensure the nurturing and development
of... citizens in appropriate numbers to maintain an enduring society." Id. (quoting John
Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 765,788 (1997)).
39. Garrison, supra note 37, at 261-68.
40. See id. at 262.
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indigency of many mothers,41 her focus on the responsible fatherhood
movement suggests that as a normative matter she agrees that fathers
should be more involved in families. Garrison's approach allows us to
consider that we might be single, in a couple, or in a polyamorous
affiliation, and justifies public funding for care because we do not
know ahead of time whether we would be the kind of person needing
care (a child, an aging parent, or a disabled intimate), a caregiver, or
neither. Because all of us are dependent children at one point, many
or most will be dependent elders, and a number are ill or disabled at
various points, reasonable people would choose to remunerate all of
these forms of care. Thus, liberal social contract theory may be
equally adept at serving McClain's goals as her liberal citizenship
theory.
Moreover, for the reasons discussed below regarding
citizenship, Garrison's social contract approach remedies the problem
of making mothers' citizenship derivative of their role in creating
(real) citizens.
Before citizenship, however, I will consider
commodification.
II. COMMODIFICATION
Commodification is the term that is generally used to describe
things, ideas, or services to which the culture (or subculture) resists
according a market value. 42 If caring for one's child had a market
value, or a higher market value, much of McClain's goal would be
met. But it does not. A rich body of literature documents the many
ways that the work that people (mostly women) do for their families
is neither socially nor economically valued. 43 McClain sees this as a
problem of privatized responsibility: we leave to parents the
responsibility to take care of their own children. At the heart of her
article is the goal of making children a public responsibility and
remunerating their parents for their care as a matter of public law. I
want to highlight three dangers of focusing on public rhetoric and
41. McClain, Care As a Public Value, supra note 2, at 1728-29.
42. The canonical text on commodification is MARGARET JANE RADIN, CONTESTED
COMMODITIES: THE TROUBLE WITH TRADE IN SEX, CHILDREN, BODY PARTS, AND OTHER
THINGS (1996). Equally groundbreaking are VIVIANA A. ZELIZER, THE SOCIAL MEANING OF

MONEY (1994), and Viviana A. Zelizer, The Purchaseof Intimacy, 25 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 817
(2000).
43. Two recent contributions to the literature are ANN CRITFENDEN, THE PRICE OF
MOTHERHOOD:

WHY THE MOST IMPORTANT

JOB IN THE WORLD IS STILL THE LEAST

VALUED (2001), and JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER: WHY FAMILY AND WORK
CONFLICT AND WHAT TO Do ABOUT IT (2000). Another book that takes the opposite position,
contending that parents enjoy subsidies, is ELINOR BURKETT, THE BABY BOON: HOW FAMILYFRIENDLY AMERICA CHEATS THE CHILDLESS (2000).
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raise the issue of whether care work that is already remunerated
(however modestly) is also a route to citizenship.
First, the term public denotes, among other things, "of, relating
to, or affecting all the people or the whole area of a nation or state,"
and "general, popular." 44 It also connotes majoritarian decision
making, reducing solutions to the lowest common denominator upon
which everyone (or a majority) can agree. It is not surprising that
McClain focuses on heterosexual, two-parent families in her analysis,
as this is the only intimate relationship that passes the rigid test of
public acceptability. Marginalized affiliations (same-sex parents,
families without children, affiliations with more than two adults, and
nonsexual affiliations) are hard to account for in this rhetoric.
McClain does account for single mothers, but seems, in contrast to
Martha Fineman's approach, to support a policy where they will pair
up with men rather than champion one which allows them to live
their lives free of men.
Second, public decision making also involves, in many
circumstances, high levels of government oversight and intrusion.
Public schools are held to constitutional standards as private schools
are not, and the public gets to comment on how public money is
spent. 45
This communalism, as Fineman has recognized, is
inconsistent with what many people view as a flourishing intimate life.
Because the danger of government incursion into the intimate lives of
caregivers raises difficulties for her theory, Fineman has devoted
46
attention to addressing the problem.
Third, public funding is not the only way to get cash to
caregivers. Private law provides subsidies to particular classes of
people to encourage socially beneficial conduct. For example, Article
9 of the Uniform Commercial Code gives secured creditors special
rights to exercise self-help to repossess collateral if debtors default on
4
their loans, and does so to encourage creditors to extend credit. 1
Private law further provides subsidies to business forms that enjoy
44. MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY, supra note 29, at 944.
45. Examples of public scrutiny of public expenditures involve controversies over whether
the National Endowment for the Arts or New York City should only fund art that complies with
predominant views of.religio-n
and sexuality. This limiftation "a ........
lk..vic pti l,
as does much public decision making.
46. See Martha Albertson Fineman, What Place for Family Privacy?, 67 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 1207, 1221-24 (1999). She concludes that "[p]roperly conceived, privacy as a principle of
self government allows the caretaker-dependent unit to flourish, supported and subsidized by
the larger society without the imposition of conformity." Id. at 1224.
47. U.C.C. § 9-609 (2000).
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limited liability, such as corporations and limited liability companies. 41
While business organizations are not perfectly analogous to families,
there may be ways to strategically import some business law rules to
remunerate caretaking. For example, perhaps caregivers could enjoy
limited liability for debts incurred in raising their children, treating
them as investors in the entity (either the family, the mother-child
dyad, or the child's citizenship). The business judgment rule, which
insulates businesses from meddling, could also be adapted to protect
mothers receiving public support from government intervention in
their families.
The literature on corporate welfare suggests that corporations
receive subsidies to further a social good such as creating jobs or
fostering economic growth. 49 Government might, for example, offer a
hog-processing plant a $2.9 million low-interest loan, property
improvements, and a deal on sewage charges to encourage the plant
to reopen. 50 We might appropriate this model to transform the
(politically unpopular) welfare that assists poor people to
"incentives" to engage in conduct that furthers a public value
(fostering civic participation by the next generation).5" Doctrines
such as the business judgment rule insulate corporations that receive
corporate welfare from suffering the kinds of intrusions into their
operations that are routinely suffered by welfare families. 52 Thus,
private law doctrines such as the limited liability of corporations and
the business judgment rule offer both public subsidies of beneficial
conduct and insulation from the "heavy-handed and intrusive"
53
interventions into family governance that McClain rejects.
48. See MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 6.22 (1984); UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 303 (1995).
49. For examples of corporate welfare, see Nick Beermann, Legal Mechanisms of PublicPrivate Partnerships:Promoting Economic Development or Benefiting Corporate Welfare?, 23
SEATrLE U. L. REV. 175 (1999).
50. Steven R. Little, Corporate Welfare Wars: The Insufficiency of Current Constraintson
State Action and the Desirabilityof a Federal Legislative Response, 22 HAMLINE L. REV. 849
(1999).
51. Martha Albertson Fineman, Cracking the Foundational Myths: Independence,
Autonomy, and Self-Sufficiency, 8 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 13, 23 (2000)
("[S]ubsidies are hidden when they are not called subsidy (or welfare, or the dole), but termed
'investments,' 'incentives,' or 'earned' when they are supplied by the government.").
52. See generally JULIE A. NICE & LOUISE G. TRUBECK, CASES AND MATERIALS ON

POVERTY LAW: THEORY AND PRACTICE 636-52 (1997) (discussing Yvette Marie Barksdale,
And the Poor Have Children: A Harm-Based Analysis of Family Caps and the Hollow
ProcreativeRights of Welfare Beneficiaries, 14 LAW & INEQ. 1 (1995); King v. Smith, 392 U.S.
309 (1968)).
53. McClain, Care As a Public Value, supra note 2, at 1729; see also Linda C. McClain,
Reconstructive Tasks for a Liberal Feminist Conception of Privacy, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV.
759 (1999).
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One problem with granting parents limited liability is that it
might cause creditors to either raise interest rates or refuse to extend
credit to mothers, in particular poor mothers. However, creditors
almost always raise these arguments when a debtor-friendly measure
is considered or enacted. 54 But most people do repay their debts, so
that creditors make money even if there is a risk of non-payment by a
few debtors. Even if we worry that limited liability for caregivers
would raise the price of credit for those borrowers or preclude their
obtaining credit, legislation could counteract this concern by allowing
creditors to deduct the caregivers' unpaid debts from the creditors'
taxable income.
This solution would create a public-private
partnership that both subsidizes carework and avoids some of the
difficulties posed with public rhetoric and derivative citizenship. The
proposal has weaknesses, however, such as the difficulty of
determining the extent to which a particular debt was incurred for
childraising expenses and the derivative nature of the claim
(stemming from the fact that creditors, rather than primary
caretakers, would enjoy the tax break). 55
One final issue relevant to commodification is that much care
work is already commodified through the modestly remunerated
work of nannies, home healthcare workers, au pairs, and daycare
workers. Questions that McClain's analysis raises include whether
this already commodified care work is also a route to citizenship. If
so, how, if at all, is it different from the wage-earner route to
citizenship?
If not, what about its current commodified state
distinguishes it from the carework that people do for their own family
members? Is there a distinction between the spiritual work of
creating citizens and the menial work of wiping noses? If so, should
we worry about the race and class implications of elevating the work
that some caregivers do over the work of others?56

54. See, e.g., Credit Practices,FTC Staff Report and Recommendation on Proposed Trade
Rgulai;on Rule 192-242 (Au. 1980), in RAYMOND T. NIMMER ET AL., COMMERCIAL
TRANSACTIONS: SECURED FINANCING: CASES, MATERIALS, PROBLEMS 34 (2d ed. 1999).

55. This final concern could be remedied in an alternative proposal allowing primary
caretakers to deduct from their taxable income all childcare expenses to the same extent that
business expenses are deductible.
56. See Dorothy E. Roberts, Spiritual and Menial Housework, 9 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 51
(1997).
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III. CITIZENSHIP

Citizenship is the third and final component in this Commentary.
McClain is in good company in correlating care and citizenship.
Historically, as she explains, feminists "invoked the values of
mothers' social contribution (or 'maternal citizenship') to advocate
for such measures as mothers' pensions."5
Anne Dailey has
suggested that caretaking is essential to democracy because good care
creates good citizens. 8 Nancy Staudt similarly suggests that taxpaying

is a mark of citizenship, and has proposed taxing the two groups that
figure most prominently in McClain's article, homemakers and poor
people.5 9 Fineman has suggested that motherhood might be a female

6
analog to a common masculine route to citizenship, military service. 0

As a thought experiment, building on the alliterative theme of
McClain's article, and indeed this Symposium, 6 I next sketch out

some implications of treating motherhood in some ways like military
service. The comparison holds both delights and dangers.
On the upside, military service accords education and employment to many economically marginalized people who otherwise
would be stuck in dead-end jobs (if employed at all) in the civilian

sector.62 Moreover, after discharge, veterans enjoy numerous perks,
such as treatment in Veterans Administration hospitals, special low
63
mortgage rates, vocational training, and support for their education.
However, these perks are not universally available and, like some
elements of motherhood, they come at enormous, some would say
prohibitive, cost.
While the military's defenders claim that its existence makes
democracy possible, it is hardly a democratic institution. First, it is
57. McClain, Care As a Public Value, supra note 2, at 1700 (citing LINDA GORDON, PITIED
BUT NOT ENTITLED: SINGLE MOTHERS AND THE HISTORY OF WELFARE 1890-1935, at 165-67
(1994)).
58. See Anne C. Dailey, Federalism and Families,143 U. PA. L. REV. 1787, 1825-60 (1995).
59. See Nancy C. Staudt, Taxing Housework, 84 GEO. L.J. 1571 (1996); Nancy C. Staudt,
Taxation Without Representation: Contemporary Reality or Historic Misstep? (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the Chicago-Kent Law Review).
60. See Fineman, supra note 51, at 19.
61. See, e.g., Martha Albertson Fineman, Contract and Care, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1403
(2001); Joan C. Williams, From Difference to Dominance to Domesticity: Care As Work, Gender
As Tradition, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1441 (2001); Mary Becker, Caring for Children and
Caretakers,76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1495 (2001).
62. Stephen R. Barley, Military Downsizing and the Career Prospects of Youths, 559
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SC. 141 (1998).
63. 1 MICHAEL E. WILDHABER ET AL., VETERANS BENEFITS MANUAL: AN ADVOCATE'S
GUIDE TO REPRESENTING VETERANS AND THEIR DEPENDENTS 2-13 to 2-27 (1991).
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restrictive. Gay people are excluded from military service, and
women are often harassed and otherwise prevented from benefiting
from military service as much as heterosexual men.64 Second, far

from being a haven of liberal individualism, the military requires
compliance with dress and behavior codes, as well as unthinking
6
compliance with commands made within a rigid hierarchy.
Analogies between maternal and military conscription are
informative. As Katherine Franke has recently noted, feminist legal
theory has yet to seriously deconstruct what she dubs
"repronormativity," the cultural and legal forces that incentivize and
subsidize motherhood. 66 If Franke is right and repronormativity is
rampant, then perhaps it makes sense to speak of maternal
conscription. The military draft is clearly nonconsensual, and one can
argue that repronormativity, particularly coupled with compulsory
heterosexuality, renders the "choice" to become a mother
problematic. 67
Margaret Atwood's futuristic dystopia The
Handmaid's Tale, in which the religious right overthrows democratic
government and conscripts women into bearing their children, is a
dark spin on the maternal draft. 68 On the other hand, however,
McClain's rhetoric about mothering as a means to facilitate the
continued existence of democracy echoes military calls to make the
69
world safe for democracy.

64. See JANET E. HALLEY, DON'T: A READER'S GUIDE TO THE MILITARY'S ANTI-GAY
POLICY (1999).
65. See, e.g., Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986) (upholding a U.S. Air Force
discipline of an orthodox Jewish officer for wearing a yarmulke, in violation of the air force
regulation prohibiting the wearing of headgear while indoors). Justice Rehnquist justified
judicial deference to military regulations as necessary to "foster instinctive obedience, unity,
commitment, and esprit de corps." Id. at 507 (emphasis added). Congress legislatively altered
this outcome by passing 10 U.S.C. § 774 (2000) (providing that "a member of the armed forces
may wear an item of religious apparel while wearing the uniform of the member's armed
force[s] .... [Unless] the wearing of the item would interfere with the performance of the
member's military duties ...[or] the item of apparel is not neat and conservative"). Of course,
the "neat and conservative" standard retains considerable authority for the military to enforce
its dress codes.
66. Katherine M. Franke, Theorizing Yes: An Essay on Feminism, Law, and Desire, 101
COLUM. L. REV. 181, 194 (2001). Another, less catchy phrase for compulsory maternity is
"matrigyno-idolatry." Diana Tietjens Meyers, The Rush to Motherhood-PronatalistDiscourse
and Women s Autonomy, 26 SIGNS 735, 758-62 (2001).
67. Adrienne Rich, Compulsory Heterosexuality and Lesbian Existence, in THE LESBIAN
AND GAY STUDIES READER 227 (Henry Abelove et al. eds., 1993).
68. MARGARET ATwOOD, THE HANDMAID'S TALE (1986).
69. See Fineman, supra note 51, at 19 ("[T]he armed services are established to attend to
the collective need for national defense.... Caretakers should have the same right to have their
society-preserving labor supported and facilitated.").
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Both McClain and Fineman seek a theoretical justification of
public support for care work without risking the public invasion that
typically accompanies support. While this goal is well worth the
considerable effort expended, we are not there yet. I suspect that the
business sphere may provide some elements that are missing from the
public law models but central to the goals of most feminists. Private
law rewards entities for performing valuable public services but also
shields them by rhetoric and doctrine from undue government
meddling. If some feminists shy away from this model because the
market often is associated with conservative rhetoric, they should
rethink that position, as family is no less so.70
McClain cites men's groups such as the Promise Keepers and
their agenda of promoting "responsible fatherhood" as a potential
means to break down the breadwinner/caregiver dichotomy. While
these groups are not uniformly reactionary (Donna Minkowitz has

documented interracial and homoerotic aspects of the Promise
Keepers, for example),7 it is a leap to characterize them as feminist.
McClain herself recognizes that "some groups within the social

movement (such as Promise Keepers and the Nation of Islam) adhere
to norms of male authority and leadership and female submission
within the home."7 2 Embracing either market or family models
entails sleeping with the enemy; feminists need only determine the
evil of these two lessers in any particular context.
It is often a close call. McClain notes evidence that public
support of mothers gives low-income girls "the time and freedom
away from family work... to 'develop another picture of themselves'
in the world,"73 allowing girls to think of options other than

70. See id. at 16 n.9 ("[Ijt is necessary to develop a rhetoric to counter the pervasiveness of
market ideology that privileges the economic and confines assessments of success, progress and
worth largely in monetary terms."). Conservative groups, such as the American Family
Association and Focus on the Family, routinely use the term "family" in their name to signal a
right wing political valence. One radical feminist recognizes the frequent confluence between
family rhetoric and antifeminist politics, defining "family, patriarchal" as "primary unit of the
sadosociety, consisting of slaves organized in domestic and sexual service to a snool as their
head," and further defining "snool" as "normal inhabitant of sadosociety, characterized by
sadism and masochism combined; stereotypic hero and/or saint of the sadostate." MARY DALY,
WEBSTERS' FIRST NEW INTERGALACTIC WICKEDARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 197, 227
(1987). "[Sladosociety," in turn, means "society spawned by phallic lust; the sum of places/times
where the beliefs and practices of sadomasochism are The Rule; Torture Cross Society:
PATRIARCHY, SNOOLDOM." Id. at 94.
71. Donna Minkowitz, In the Name of the Father, MS., Nov./Dec. 1995, at 64.
72. McClain, Care As a Public Value, supra note 2, at 1722.
73. Id. at 1726 (quoting LISA DODSON, DON'T CALL US OUT OF NAME: THE UNTOLD
LIVES OF WOMEN AND GIRLS INPOOR AMERICA 215 (2d prtg. 1999)).
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adolescent motherhood for themselves. Moreover, she points out, the
burden of caring for younger siblings at home (which happens more
often when mothers lack material support), makes some young
women seek out early motherhood, figuring that they may as well
care for their own children if they are stuck doing childcare.7 4
McClain also argues that young mothers could use government
subsidies to pursue their education, thus improving their own
prospects and their children's, as well as delaying the birth of
additional children. 75 But legal economists might challenge these
premises, contending that if we subsidize something, we get more of
it.76
Thus, if we subsidize female caregiving through "modern
mothers' pension[s]," then perhaps we would get more mothering,
more association of female gender roles with care, and less female
market participation. On the other hand, of course, perhaps that
increased mothering, as McClain presumes, would create better
citizens and thus contribute to the public welfare in the long run.
Moreover, if primary caregiving were remunerated, then it would be
market work. A key question in any proposal is whether government
subsidies of parenting would be accompanied by government
interventions, decreasing the quality of care by requiring it to comply
with majoritarian morality and destroying the very intimacy that
fosters human flourishing and, in turn, good citizens.
Both public and private routes exist to the important goal of
remunerating care work. McClain harnesses diverse theoretical and
rhetorical discourses (liberalism, civic republicanism, responsible
fatherhood), riding the horse in the direction it is going by using
majoritarian rhetoric about valuing family life and feminine roles in
creating citizens. Private law is another horse, also heading in the
direction of popular discourse, given the increased privatization of
domestic relations law and public hostility to assisting poor families. 77
I have tried to suggest that while McClain's article does impressive
work on the task of carving out a place for parenting work in the
political realm, private law can similarly provide models for
remunerating parents for the valuable work they do in caring for their
families (however constituted). Perhaps the optimal proposal, in this
area as in others, is a marriage of public and private, strategically
74. Id. at 1726.
75. Id. at 1727.
76. See RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON 167-68 (1992).
77. See Jana B. Singer, The Privatizationof Family Law, 1992 WISC. L. REV. 1443; NICE &
TRUBECK, supra note 52, at 96-132.
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mining both toward the end of addressing the positive problem of
caregiver indigency and the normative problem of transcending the
dichotomy between the family and the market. While the route from
selfless caregiver to citizen is not nearly as predictable as the
progression from A to Z, McClain's analysis of the three Rs has made
a substantial contribution to our education on the topic.

